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The Religious Freedom Review (Ruddock Review), established by the Government of Australia, provided an opportunity to make some suggestions 
and proposals for ways to understand religious liberty 
in this country. The purpose of the author’s Submission 
to the Review, and of this article, is to show more 
accurately what is at stake and how certain traditional 
categorisations stand in the way of more useful and fair 
ways of viewing religion and the public sphere. Some 
of the suggestions relate to human rights legislation, 
where many questions of religious liberty are or should 
be addressed, but other aspects go well beyond that to 
the question of how we think of religion in relation to 
the contemporary state itself. These considerations are 
framed within an evaluation of how some challenges to 
religious liberty have emerged and been dealt with in 
other countries, particularly Canada and South Africa.
This article is focused on important principles. It 
discusses religious liberty, human rights and human 
communities, as well as the language often employed 
to describe the relationship between them. For it is 
in understanding the role and nature of communities 
in relation to some aspects of scholarly and practical 
concern regarding religious liberty, human rights 
and religious communities themselves, as these are 
developing in practice, that we can understand the role 
and nature of religious liberty today: context is key to 
understanding what should be avoided or adopted.
This article raises concerns about the context of 
religious liberty and human rights today, particularly 
where bi-furcative or dualistic uses are employed in 
relation to the interpretation of the de-contextualised 
terminology usually used in a human rights context - 
terms such as ‘equality’ and ‘non-discrimination’. These 
terms are bi-furcative or dualistic when they are used 
expressly or implicitly to bracket religious belief outside 
shared public dimensions. Such uses (believer/unbeliever, 
‘communities of faith’, ‘people of faith’ etc.) fail to 
describe accurately the nature of the realm of competing 
belief systems that is the reality of the contemporary 
public sphere. Simply put, this is because everyone has 
‘faith’ and ‘belief’, often without knowing that they do or 
without acknowledging their commitments to whatever 
they believe in (and it is not possible to believe nothing): 
not all ‘beliefs’ or ‘faith’ are religious, meaning that not 
all are oriented to a Divinity. Atheists and agnostics are, 
therefore, also believers of a certain kind and, if we wish 
a fair sharing of the public sphere, their commitments 
should have no dominant position there. 
Worse, ideas that the public sphere is ‘secular’ or ‘neu-
tral’, when this is neither true nor possible, further obfus-
cate descriptions of the reality that are so important for un-
derstanding what is actually at issue when religious liberty 
is being discussed or analysed in relation to the state.
This article does not develop the arguments for or 
against particular legislative language, except in relation 
to the important terms ‘discrimination’ (as discussed in the 
submission of ‘Freedom for Faith’1) and ‘hatred’, when what 
is really at issue is mere disagreement. This article focuses 
on principles that should apply whatever frameworks 
are adopted in future. The author has been privileged to 
have read the submissions of Freedom for Faith and of the 
Catholic Bishops and agrees with the recommendations in 
both of these submissions, so does not repeat them here.
As will be seen, this article raises serious concerns 
about how religious liberty and human rights are 
being developed in other countries and, in particular, 
how diversity is being threatened by those who have 
agendas to push and who see human rights legislation or 
particular de-contextualised approaches to ‘equality’ or 
‘discrimination’ as a ready means of doing so. This is the 
result of the abstraction of principles from communities. 
This article pushes back on such abstraction and calls into 
question the legitimacy of avoiding the lived context of 
communities. In several instances this article identifies 
direct challenges to human rights that are themselves 
posed in the name of human rights.
There is much to be said for protecting the role of 
legislative bodies rather than transferring policymaking 
to judicial or quasi-judicial bodies such as human rights 
tribunals. Often such transfers are justified under the 
guise of human rights ‘discrimination’ protection or 
‘advancing equality’, where both concepts are detached 
from the context that is essential to a diverse and plural 
society. This article outlines some of these concerns, 
drawing particularly on the experiences around human 
rights discourse and policy in Canada and South Africa. 
No comment is made on the outworking of human rights 
in Australia; but it is assumed, with good reason, that the 
tendencies identified elsewhere, particularly in regard to 
lack of respect for individual and community difference, 
will be evident as well in Australia - though it will be 
for those more expert in this jurisdiction to make that 
assessment alongside what is seen in other countries.
It may be asserted that ‘things are fine’ in both Canada 
and South Africa, but having acted as an academic and 
legal advisor to a wide variety of groups in both countries, 
this author can confirm that things are anything but fine. 
There is considerable concern in these countries that 
the vague language of ‘human rights’, as with the vague 
language of ‘equality’, is being used as a blank slate upon 
which those with transformational aims can attempt 
to force their versions of culture on society in general, 
using the power of law to do so through human rights 
cases.2 For this reason, great care must be taken in any 
approach to ‘human rights’ today. This article raises some 
of these foundational concerns for the consideration of 
the Review and, perhaps, beyond it. Professor Parkinson, 
in his Freedom for Faith submission, suggests that debates 
around the nature of marriage, and the fall-out from what 
the redefinitions lead to, are ‘resolved’; with respect, I 
suggest otherwise.3 Litigation in Canada and the United 
States, to name but two countries, shows that, following 
re-definition, a host of challenges, some of them highly 
aggressive, can be anticipated. It is to be hoped that the 
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Review, by delineating some of the potential pitfalls where 
religious liberty is not adequately protected, will apply 
lessons from other countries so as to avoid anticipated 
similar challenges in Australia in the years ahead.
The recent decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
denying accreditation to a Law School on the basis 
of its Evangelical Protestant ‘Community Covenant’ 
looks to have wide-spread and perhaps international 
implications. That Covenant at Trinity Western University, 
a private university in British Columbia, included a 
limitation of marriage to only married heterosexuals, 
and excluded same-sex relationships as well as non-
married heterosexual ones. Since the community view 
was that the only valid marriage should be between 
one man and one woman - a standard view for most 
traditional religions - the extension of ‘public interest’ 
to rule against accreditation of the private law school 
shows how notions of ‘public’ and ‘diversity’ must be 
carefully understood in relation to access to public goods. 
Such matters as tax exempt status, charitable status and 
other types of licencing and accreditation are now at 
risk for religious groups and projects if they do not toe 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s majority reasoning. The 
decision is attracting a firestorm of controversy.4
One point referred to bears repeating here. Despite 
express legislative statements indicating that various view-
points on the nature of marriage were part of the Canadian 
scene, and clear indications in the legislation that religious 
officials would not be subjected to pressures to conform to 
the broader definition, Canada has experienced an unre-
lenting wave of legal and social challenges to those who 
continue to affirm ‘traditional marriage’. This is not a good 
outcome. If Australia is to head off some of the more aggres-
sive and unjust campaigns against advocates of traditional 
marriage, the Review should address expressly the need for 
unambiguous protections in the areas that have been hot 
spots for litigation in other countries (charitable status, ac-
creditation, curriculum, parental rights, marriage counselling, 
marriage commissioners, definitions of ‘hate speech’ etc.). 
RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF
1. Getting the language of ‘faith’, ‘belief’ and the 
nature of the public sphere correct
Ensure that the language used to describe the nature 
of the state accurately reflects its philosophical (and 
theological) realities and is, as much as possible, 
descriptive of the nature of citizens as ‘believers’, 
the state as ‘inclusive’ of all citizens (religious and 
non-religious) and all communities as, in some sense, 
‘communities of faith’. These terms may be employed 
in ways that suggest that ‘faith’ and ‘belief’ are the 
properties of religious individuals and their communities 
only. This is an error that fails to deal adequately with 
the realities. Everyone is a ‘believer’: the question is 
not whether one is, but rather what one believes in. To 
place, therefore, religious beliefs at any sort of ‘public 
disadvantage’ is to act secularistically, furthering the 
strategy of exclusion set out by the man who coined the 
term ‘secularism’ - George Jacob Holyoake.5 The public 
sphere, rightly understood, is the realm of competing 
belief systems - some religious, some not, but all are 
belief-based and everyone acts on the basis of faith, 
since not all faith is religious faith. Faith and belief are 
essential for everyone, whether they realise it or not.
2.  Freedom from and freedom for religion
Ensure that the formula ‘freedom from religion’ is not 
employed when what is usually meant is ‘freedom from 
religious coercion’. A ‘strict separationist’ mindset can 
creep in alongside flawed suggestions that citizens have a 
‘right’ (which they do not) to be freed from any incidents 
of the public manifestation of religious belief. To take 
one example, the presence of religious ceremonies held 
in public ought not to trigger claims that citizens should 
be free from seeing or hearing any public manifestation. 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
protects the right ‘…alone or in community with others 
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in 
teaching, practice, worship and observance’. The limits to 
such manifestations are significant and weighty: ‘subject 
only to such limitations as are determined by law solely 
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society’.6
3.  Focus on unjust discrimination, not just 
‘discrimination’
Create the category of ‘unjust discrimination’, not simply 
‘discrimination’, so as to distinguish between just and 
unjust discriminations in any legislation.
4.  Recognise a general ‘Presumption in Favour of 
Diversity’
Any legal developments should include a presumption in 
favour of diversity.7
5.  Where a religious ethos is shared, recognise not only 
the ‘core religious functions’
Respect the organic approach to religious exemptions 
so that all employees in a given religious organisation 
have their beliefs respected, not just those in ‘leadership’ 
roles. Do not make any employment-related exemptions 
depend on the functions of the job in an organisation that 
has a shared ethos. An ‘organic approach’ recognises that, 
for some sorts of religious projects, everyone is involved 
in the religious mission irrespective of their actual job-
functions. Where, for example, a janitor or gardener is 
involved in prayers, leading sacred text studies or playing 
religious music, it would be wrong to say that the nature 
of their ‘job duties’ qua gardener, janitor etc. are not 
part of the shared religious ethos or organic mission of 
the project. The error of ‘core function’ analysis is that it 
simply looks at the leadership team of a religious project 
as the only positions sheltered by religious exemptions, 
thereby ignoring or showing scant regard for the 
associational dimension of religious belief and projects.
6. Accommodate the exercise of conscience
Ensure that the duty of the accommodation of conscience 
is spelled out as both a public and private necessity. In 
relation to medical (and pharmaceutical) services, the 
right to conscientious objection and non-referral should 
be recognised explicitly and protected.
7.  Limit ‘hate speech’ to the incitement of violence, not 
merely ‘hurt feelings’
Limit offensive speech restrictions to ‘incitement to 
commit violence or physical harm’. 















Religious Liberty Council to encourage the 
involvement of civil society
Consider establishing a Religious Liberty Commission, 
consisting, in part, of representatives put forward by the 
major religions themselves. The Head of this Commission 
shall be elected from among the Members for a rotating 
period of no longer than two terms (of three years each). 
In addition, consider establishing a Religious Council as 
an adjunct to the Commission, made up of appointees 
from the religions, other concerned citizens and 
representative members of the Commission itself.8
9.  Ensure that the public sphere is fully accessible 
to religious and non-religious citizens (and their 
projects) alike
Make clear that the ‘public sphere’ is one fully accessible 
to all citizens, religious and non-religious. The privatising 
of religion was and is one of the goals of secularism 
which, properly understood, is an anti-religious ideology.
10. Co-operation not ‘Separation’ of ‘Church and State’
Australia, in common with Canada and South Africa, 
enjoys the ‘co-operation’ of religion and the state, not its 
separation. In so far as there is jurisdictional separation, 
this does not undermine the essential co-operation (but 
not merger) of ‘church and state’, and this relationship 
should be expressed as a co-operation not separation.
A.  BACKGROUND: IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The importance of understanding the proper scope of 
human rights: it should not be ‘The New Secular Religion 
of Our Time’
Writing as an academic new to Australia, but one 
experienced with law as a theorist and practitioner in 
Canada, South Africa and Europe, this author believes it 
is important to see the development and extension of 
human rights as part of a Western movement to protect 
human rights but one that, paradoxically, often threatens 
the very diversity it purports to respect. 
Who can object to ‘protecting human rights’? In this day 
and age it has become a mantra, but one must be careful 
that what is established contains genuine safeguards for 
diversity; many of those who argue for the extension of 
human rights have, as an implied goal, forced changes to 
the beliefs of others with which they disagree. Compelling 
others to agree by force of law with moral propositions or 
actions that ought to be open for dissent in a free society 
is the very definition of an authoritarian state. History 
shows all too clearly that it is in the protection of and 
respect for difference on those subjects that matter most 
to many of us that an ‘open society’ remains free. Shutting 
down dissent and failing to grant accommodation is the 
preferred tactic of those who wish to use law, rather than 
popular debate and changeable legislative frameworks, to 
obtain cultural dominance.
This article argues that for many people religious lib-
erty and human rights are viewed as threatening; this need 
not be the case. If the goal is to create a culture in which 
religious liberty and human rights are respected, then the 
culture produced must be one that recognises respect. In 
particular, the structure of any human rights instruments 
must be framed in part in relation to the experiences in 
other countries and must do what it can to put into place 
protections to show respect for diversity, against those 
who often will try to use human rights itself to attack 
diversity or coerce people to change how they think.9
Legislation can be changed within the rough and ready 
flexibility of democratic politics; constitutions are less flexi-
ble, and the vague application of balancing and proportion-
ality tests transfers vast areas of social control to unelected 
judicial bodies and tribunals. Over the door of every human 
rights tribunal should be the phrase: ‘tread carefully here, 
for the right to disagree is essential to freedom’.
Considering how and whether to adopt Bills of Rights 
or Human Rights Protections can be a useful exercise, 
provided that such extension maintains respect for 
diversity and understands the danger of human rights 
themselves becoming ideological and, in fact, coercive. 
Case law from other countries, particularly Canada, 
has shown just such unwarranted extensions of human 
rights. In Canada it is routine for religious believers and 
their communities to feel threatened by human rights 
complaints, in which the goal of the complaint often 
seems to be the forcing of new conceptions of morality on 
communities that ought to be protected to develop and 
maintain their own belief systems as free as possible from 
coercion by the state (understood as law and politics).
American political theorists Stephen Macedo and 
William Galston10 and English philosopher John Gray11 
have all warned of the dangers of illiberal ‘convergence’, 
or the tendencies towards ‘civic totalism’ that lurk within 
many legal or political approaches that use the rhetoric 
of ‘liberalism’ or ‘human rights’ today. These writers and 
others have rightly identified the danger of attempts to 
force other citizens to ‘toe the line’ in relation to matters 
that should properly remain open. Abortion, euthanasia 
and the nature of marriage are three contemporary issues 
that show the capacity or incapacity of democratic regimes 
to properly respect the morally different viewpoints of 
citizens. In each case the historical record ought to give 
us considerable cause for concern, as the principles of 
accommodation discussed in this article are often lacking 
or not present at all in relation to these issues.
William Galston, for example, has warned that:
…an account of liberal democracy built on a foundation 
of political pluralism should make us very cautious 
about expanding the scope of state power in ways that 
mandate uniformity.12
With respect to the relationship between an 
abstraction such as ‘equality’ and the lived communal 
reality of diversity, South Africa’s former Constitutional 
Court Justice, Albie Sachs, had this to say about diversity 
in a decision dealing with the rights of gays and lesbians:
[E]quality should not be confused with uniformity; in 
fact, uniformity can be the enemy of equality. Equality 
means equal concern and respect across difference. It 
does not presuppose the elimination or suppression 
of difference. Respect for human rights requires the 
affirmation of self, not the denial of self. Equality 
therefore does not imply a levelling or homogenisation 
of behaviour but an acknowledgment and acceptance 
of difference.13
One may believe, even vehemently, that everyone 
should accept his or her view of same-sex conduct, or (to 
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that the priesthood within Roman Catholicism should be 
female as well as male, or that issues such as abortion and 
euthanasia should not allow for dissent; one may argue for 
that viewpoint in public and private spheres. One is not, 
however, entitled to force those who disagree to have their 
views and presumably organisations ‘purged’ from society, 
coerced to change or forced to co-operate with the beliefs 
of others by force of law. At least, so Gray and Galston 
counsel in their approaches to liberalism.  
Human rights ought not to be an ‘Unofficial State 
Religion’ or become an ideology that seeks to force 
convergence or cultural ‘Transformation’
Former Canadian Justice Minister and a noted human 
rights and religious liberty expert, Irwin Cotler, once 
referred, without irony or criticism, to human rights as 
‘the new secular religion of our time’.14 This ought to 
raise concerns for those who believe in the appropriate 
jurisdictional division between ‘church and state’. Yet 
another leading Canadian authority on human rights, 
Michael Ignatieff, in what could be seen as a rejection 
of Cotler’s un-nuanced statement, has warned of the 
significant danger of viewing human rights as ‘idolatry’ or 
as some kind of replacement religion.15 He writes:
Human rights is misunderstood, I shall argue, if it is 
seen as a “secular religion”. It is not a creed; it is not 
metaphysics. To make it so is to turn it into a species 
of idolatry: humanism worshipping itself. Elevating 
the moral and metaphysical claims made on behalf of 
human rights may be intended to increase its universal 
appeal. In fact, it has the opposite effect, raising doubts 
among religious and non-Western groups who do not 
happen to be in need of Western secular creeds.16
There is a reason that human rights ought not to be 
perceived or treated as ‘a new secular religion’: it does 
not have the competence to do what religions do. For 
another thing, human rights cannot be a religion as it is for 
everyone and is generalised across a national- or state-
based jurisdiction. As such it must be for the benefit of all 
citizens, whether they are religious or not. It is in the nature, 
therefore, of a common denominator, and ought not to have 
either implicitly or explicitly a ‘transformational’ (religious) 
mandate. It must work with civic associations (including 
religions) as it finds them, not start out with an implicit or 
explicit idea that it has a mandate to ‘change society’.
For reasons in part articulated by Ignatieff, human 
rights can properly have no such mandate in a pluralistic 
and diverse society. To make it ‘transformative’ in any way 
can only result in an insufficient respect for differing con-
texts - contexts that, in themselves, do have a right to the 
metaphysical traditions that speak of personal and group 
‘transformation’ but through, typically, the languages of re-
ligious commitments and in some cases Divine revelation. 
For human rights to take on this mantle would mean that 
it will inevitably become not only ‘idolatrous’, as Ignatieff 
understands it, but, given its legal mandate, dangerously 
theocratic in practice - threatening religions as it does so 
and, paradoxically, undercutting the very enlightenment 
project of de-coupling the state from religions. 
Human rights should not occupy expressly or by 
default the roles of religions. For all the above reasons 
and others, great care must be taken, therefore, to ensure 
that wide latitude is given to alternative belief systems 
(religious and otherwise) so as to ensure their ability to 
operate without fear of hindrance or reprisal. Human rights 
discourse and policy (and legislation) need to focus on 
developing new approaches that assist diversity in reality, 
not only in name while hosting homogenising conceptions 
of culture under a guise of respecting diversity. Sadly, 
such nuanced care is no longer the standard template in 
Canada, where it is now routine for religious believers and 
their communities to face unrelenting challenges to their 
open and free operation, or even to the existence of their 
projects - such as, most recently, founding a Christian-
based law school.17 Australia could easily be taken down 
the same road and must think carefully and differently lest 
such errors be repeated here.18
This is not the place to embark on a detailed analysis 
of how this happened, but something like the expansion 
of law in attempts to replace, by law, concepts that were 
developed within the metaphysical richness of religions 
plays a large part in this shift: one need only consider 
how contemporaries ground the notion of ‘respect for the 
person’ or ‘dignity of the person’ when religious grounds 
provided the cornerstone of human rights in the past. The 
‘liberal consensus’ that many felt comfortable with has 
now been widely regarded as having broken down. Thus, 
Paul Horwitz has written, somewhat boldly, that:
…we are now in the twilight of the liberal consensus 
as we have known it. It may survive, with important 
revisions. Or it may collapse all together, and new 
prophets will arise to predict what will come after 
it. One thing, however, seems certain: the liberal 
consensus that emerged after the enlightenment, gelled 
in the nineteenth century, and reached a more or less 
stable form in the twentieth century, cannot last much 
longer as a basic, unquestioned assumption about the 
way we live. From within and beyond its borders, the 
liberal consensus is under attack. On all sides we are 
hearing calls, sometimes measured and sometimes 
shrill, for a revision or an outright rejection of the terms 
of the liberal treaty.19
The traditions that gave us ‘civic virtues’ are no 
longer understood and even within these traditions the 
language of ‘virtue’ has been replaced, almost entirely, 
by the vague and amorphous language of ‘values’, with 
few recognising the tremendous catastrophe this poses to 
our understanding of shared meaning. Professor Edward 
Andrew of the University of Toronto has noted that ‘... 
there has been only partial awareness [in the Western 
academy] that the language of values entails that nothing 
is intrinsically good and nobody is intrinsically worthy’.20 
Such a diagnosis ought to concern anyone who believes 
that human beings are intrinsically worthy but who is 
trying to articulate this in the ‘language of values’.
Identifying the general problems of ‘convergence’ 
and ‘civic totalism’, referred to above, and recognising the 
authoritarian dimensions of notions such as ‘deep equality’ 
(as discussed in Canada) give us some tools to analyse 
these moves when they arise in politics, law, religious 
studies and sociology, to name a few disciplines now 
interested in human rights. Here, an observation by David 
Novak appropriately sums up what has been discussed:
A society dedicated to the protection and enhancements 
of its participatory cultures surely commands more 















merely to protect and enhance property. When, 
however, a civil society no longer respects that 
communal priority, it inevitably attempts to replace 
that sacred realm by becoming a sacred realm itself. 
As such, it attempts to become the highest realm in 
the lives of its citizens. In becoming what some have 
called a ‘civil religion,’ civil society usurps the role 
of historic traditions of faith. It becomes what it was 
never intended to be, for the hallmark of a democratic 
social order is the continuing limitation of its governing 
range. Without such limitation, any society tends to 
expand its government indefinitely. But such limitation 
cannot come from within; it can only come from what 
is both outside it and above it. Today that external and 
transcendent limitation can be found in the freedom 
of citizens in a democracy to find their primal identity 
by being and remaining a part of their traditional 
communities. This is what has come to be known in 
democracies as religious liberty.21
To Novak’s insight that civil society as civil religion 
becomes a ‘sacred realm’ itself, we need to add that law 
becomes the divinity in such a metastasised vision. The 
antidote to the drug of civic or legal inflation, and the 
corresponding deflation of respect for associations and 
difference, is a re-understanding of what is actually taking 
place where law, religion and society meet. Human rights 
is now at the cutting edge of attempts to remake society 
by law and, for the reasons this article sets out, we should 
be highly suspicious of these developments and try to 
ensure that the utopian dimensions of the projects are 
avoided where possible and blocked where necessary.
B. SPECIFC ANALYSIS OF RECOMMENDED PROVISIONS
1.  Not all discrimination is bad: the need for specificity 
in relation to the term ‘Discrimination’
Not all discrimination is bad or should be the subject of 
legal penalties. This is widely misunderstood. People 
must make discriminations and distinctions all the 
time, such as in routine matters related to job hiring, 
the granting of licences, the making of any legislative 
category that touches on age or disability or, in 
appropriate settings, relevant and important decisions 
and distinctions based on sex or even religion.
A diverse and open society is one that can manage 
the many forms of accommodation necessary to ensure 
appropriate freedoms and their exercise. Restrictive 
societies, on the other hand, fail to provide for such 
accommodation. Grand-sounding language using the 
rhetoric of ‘non-discrimination’ or ‘equality’, both vague 
terms, may often be used to reduce the very things they 
claim to expand. Thus, George Orwell’s use of the term 
‘equality’ in his justly famous short novel Animal Farm, 
in which ‘all animals are equal and some are more equal 
than others’, alerts or ought to alert us to the risks of this 
sort of rhetorical take-over of freedom by languages of 
pseudo-egalitarianism.22
2.  The need to respect diversity and difference in clear 
and express language and recognise that they are 
prior to equality; the creation of a legal presumption 
in favour of diversity
Terms such as ‘equality’ must be understood as following 
upon context, not as somehow prior to context. Just as 
there should be a presumption in favour of diversity in any 
proposed law, there should also be express recognition of 
differences in relation to beliefs of religion and conscience 
and, therefore, ample protection where conscience is 
under threat from ‘one size fits all’ application. This means 
that, in areas such as controversies in the medical field 
(euthanasia and abortion) or related to aspects of culture 
(such as the nature of marriage or gender roles within 
religions), safeguards need to be provided for in relation 
to exemptions and allowances for difference. It can be 
anticipated, as has been seen in other jurisdictions, that 
human rights will become little more than a tool used to 
beat diversity into submission, if our legal mechanisms do 
not set out that diversity as the recognised prior condition: 
deep diversity is the goal here.
In other words diversity, respected as difference, is the 
setting within which equality is understood, not the other 
way around. It should be remembered that, in fact, in all 
constitutions and human rights frameworks, ‘religion’ is an 
‘equality right’, so the placing of these in opposition, as if 
they are in conflict, misunderstands the correct relation-
ship between them. Again, it should be the associational 
context that provides the framework within which equal-
ity is assessed, not some abstract conception of ‘equality’ 
dropped like a mist on culture, including associations.
Mere difference of opinion may, for example, be 
stigmatised in clever rhetoric to avoid the nuanced moral 
distinctions that some believe to be important and that 
define the different moral approaches of different belief-
communities. Thus, in relation to the morality of sexual acts, 
it is a frequent thing to hear one side of the debate - that 
with the longest moral tradition and greatest number of 
associations gathered around these conceptions – typecast 
as ‘homophobic’ by those who have a different view. Yet the 
term ‘homophobia’, when unpacked, discloses a failure to 
respect any allowable position from which to disagree with 
the morality of homosexual acts. Similarly, poor philosophy 
conflates desire with the right to exercise a desire in rela-
tion to ‘sexual orientation’, yet allows such exercise only 
in relation to some desires (not polygamy or polyamory 
or pedophilia, for example) - so moral distinctions are still 
present but, due to the nature of the debates, largely inco-
herent. These are worrying realities about which legislators 
should be aware in such difficult and contested areas.
Freedom depends upon lived diversity and laws 
that protect that diversity in significant ways, not in the 
erection of frameworks that claim to respect diversity in 
theory but fail to do so in practice. The Canadian dilemma 
is the gradual domination of pseudo-diversity in court 
and human rights decisions. This lack of respect is also, 
unfortunately, visible in Australia, as the section below 
on the lack of proper conscience protection in health care 
demonstrates.
3.  The need to respect the overall ethos or organic 
nature in employer exemption cases rather than the 
less respectful ‘Core Functions’ approach
It has been recognised that a ‘job-parsing’ or ‘integral 
role’ test narrows religious liberty unduly, and fails to 
respect the differences between the kinds of religious 
organisations that exist. In many, the religious ‘mission’ 
and ‘ethos’ is not limited to only a few ‘leaders’ but is an 
integral part of the whole organisation and its function. 
Therefore, to focus only on ‘key roles’ misses this 
proper respect for religious diversity. A better approach, 














recommended by Canadian scholar Alvin Esau and the 
author of this article, is the ‘organic’ or ‘shared ethos’ 
approach set out in the latter's PhD thesis.23
In this approach, the question that should be asked of 
religious organisations is: ‘what kind of an organisation 
is it?’ If the religious ethos is shared by everyone 
through manifestation, teaching and practice (such as 
teaching, prayer, sacred-text study, retreats etc.), then it is 
inappropriate to limit religious employment exemptions 
to only ‘key positions’, since everyone in the organisations 
is practicing religion ‘organically’. This being the case, 
limiting the tests, as many tribunals have done, to ‘key 
personnel’ is a significant reduction in the respect for 
religious liberty and the respect that should be shown to 
religious organisations that function in this ‘organic’ way.
4.  The ‘duty of accommodation’ in health care is 
badly handled in Australia: the need for conscience 
protection and laws that explicitly ensure that there 
is no ‘duty of referral’ and that the proper placement 
of the onus for the ‘service’ is on the state
Respect for diversity in a medical context requires 
careful handling of difference and dissent, and it 
requires attention, often missing, to where the onus 
lies for obtaining ‘access to services’. Too frequently, it 
is just assumed that the primary medical or health care 
specialist bears that onus where other means could be 
implemented with a bit of ingenuity.
In relation to medical ethics, the practices of both 
abortion and euthanasia (the former now legal in some 
countries or, as in Australia, officially illegal but with 
very wide exceptions) can fail to respect the capacity 
of citizens to dissent. It is all too common to see, as one 
does in Australia, a failure to recognise that requiring 
referrals for abortion (as it would be for euthanasia) is 
to treat the autonomous moral views of the health care 
worker as irrelevant – it is to accord no respect for the 
dignity of the dissenting professional and to load all the 
‘autonomy value’ on to the patient, yet this cannot be 
correct when two autonomies are in conflict. This error 
is all too common and ought to provide serious concern 
about how moral issues are weighed at the moment in 
Australia.24 The current failure to respect diversity in 
relation to accommodation in medicine may be seen 
as reflecting an attitude of ‘non-accommodation’, and 
this observation might well extend to other areas. Such 
errors can only be countered or protected against by 
clear language spelling out the need to provide respect 
for dissent and the duty of accommodation in all areas of 
public and private employment.
5.  Another language aspect: offensive speech and the 
need to define this tightly so that ‘Hurt Feelings’ do 
not become equated with ‘Hatred’
Some human rights approaches wish to protect people 
from being exposed to offensive speech. For example, 
the Canadian decision overturning certain language in 
a Provincial Human Rights Statute nevertheless failed 
to completely overturn its vague and chilling language. 
Here, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision 
overturned a trial decision which had upheld the ruling of 
a Human Rights Tribunal. The Supreme Court of Canada 
chose to disregard the arguments of many groups and 
academics and left in place a very heavily criticised 
approach to ‘hate speech’.25
The Supreme Court of Canada upheld but narrowed the 
legislation by striking out the words ‘ridicules, belittles or 
otherwise affronts the dignity of’. The court ruled that this 
language was unconstitutional, creating too low a thresh-
old and thus not aligned with the purposes of the Sas-
katchewan Human Rights Act. The result is that ’hatred’ in 
Canada is defined as ‘extreme manifestations of the words 
“detestation” and “vilification”, a threshold that would 
not include merely repugnant or offensive expression’. 
Moreover, tribunals were directed to consider ’the effects 
of the expression not its inherent offensiveness’.26 This was 
not the approach that free speech and religious groups 
called for, namely, to confine the definition of ‘hate speech’ 
to ‘that which incites violence’, as it continues to suppress 
speech that falls short of incitement.
The Respondent on the appeal was a man who 
manifested his religious faith by placing certain leaflets 
in places such as apartment buildings, pointing out that 
in local gay newspapers older men were soliciting young 
men for sex. His pamphlets were deemed offensive 
but the debate was whether they constituted ‘hatred’. 
Despite striking down a portion of the legislation, the 
Supreme Court of Canada found against the man for 
calling some gays ‘sodomites’ and saying that some of 
them were ‘out to get your children’, thus upholding 
the law that many thought overboard and leaving in 
place the fine against him. Many thought that these 
expressions, while clearly not polite, ought not to have 
been construed as ‘hatred’. Whatcott had argued that he 
was trying to protect young men from his own fate at the 
hands of older men he believed were predatory. There is 
widespread dissatisfaction with the result in Canada.
Meanwhile, a Report prepared for the Canadian Federal 
Government by academic Richard Moon recommended 
repeal of Section 13, the ‘hate speech’ Section of the 
Canada Human Rights Act. Professor Moon argued that, if 
complete repeal was not to occur, such speech should be 
limited to ‘advocating violence’. He further argued that the 
more appropriate approach and place for such restrictions 
was under the Criminal Code and in the Criminal courts, 
not before Tribunals, which he found on his review to have, 
inter alia, insufficient safeguards to protect fundamental 
rights.27 The Section was repealed in June 2013. Clearly 
the area of ‘offensive speech’ is far from settled in Canada. 
The current public rhetoric over same-sex marriage in 
Australia suggests that such allegations of ‘hatred’ for what 
is merely the advocacy of traditional marriage will occur 
here, too, unless legal protections are set up in advance.
In addition, the South African Charter of Religious 
Rights and Freedoms, a civil society Charter under Section 
234 of the South African Constitution, signed by all the 
Religions of that country in 2010, also recommends that 
the freedom of expression be limited only according to 
hatred defined as constituting ‘incitement to violence or 
[that causes] physical harm’.28 The full provision reads: 
6.4 Every person has the right to religious dignity, which 
includes not to be victimised, ridiculed or slandered 
on the ground of their faith, religion, convictions or 
religious activities. No person may advocate hatred that 
is based on religion, and that constitutes incitement to 
violence or to cause physical harm. (emphasis added)
The developed and developing view, therefore, based 















by the religions in South Africa, is that the best approach 
is to limit ‘hate speech’ to incitement of violence or 
physical harm and to subject it to Criminal proceedings, 
rather than to administrative Tribunals under vague 
categories such as ‘hurt feelings’ or ‘offended dignity’. 
When these are allowed, such uses are likely to chill 
(i.e. inhibit or discourage) valid free speech or may be 
deployed in relation to contemporary notions such as 
‘homophobia’, which has been discussed above.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Since human rights expansion fails to respect 
diversity, diversity must be recognised expressly as a 
good to be maintained, and any developments should 
include a presumption in favour of diversity.
2. Since not all ‘discriminations’ can be said to be legally 
wrong, create the category of ‘unjust discrimination’ to 
distinguish it from ‘discrimination’.
3. Human rights tests in relation to exemptions usually 
fail to respect the ethos of organisations as they tend 
to have a bias towards individual rather than group 
rights - in particular, a specific ‘job-parsing’ approach 
to employment exemptions that focuses on so-called 
‘core functions’ fails to respect properly the nature 
of certain kinds of religious organisations. Therefore, 
do not make any employment-related exemptions 
dependant upon the functions of the job in the case of 
an organisation where there is a shared ethos; instead, 
respect the organic approach to religious exemptions 
so that all employees in such an organisation, not just 
those in ‘leadership’ roles, have their beliefs respected.
4. The duty of accommodation is essential in all areas 
of public or private function, and existing practice in 
Australia (particularly in relation to medical issues) 
shows a marked failure to provide accommodation 
and respect for conscience. Therefore, the duty of the 
accommodation of conscience should be spelled out 
as both a public and private necessity and, in relation 
to medical (and pharmaceutical) services, the right to 
conscientious objection and non-referral should be 
recognised and protected.
5. Since ‘hate speech’ chills expression and there has 
been wide criticism of ‘feelings’-based tests for insult 
or injury, it is important to limit offensive speech 
restrictions to ‘incitement to violence or physical harm’. 
IAIN T. BENSON 
is Professor of Law at the University of Notre Dame, Sydney, and 
Extraordinary Professor of Law at the University of the Free State, 
Bloemfontein, South Africa. He has acted for a wide variety of groups 
before all levels of court in Canada, including the Supreme Court. He 
has consulted to many groups in Canada and overseas in relation to 
constitutional and human rights, with a particular focus on religious 
liberty and theories of pluralism and sharing of the public sphere.  
Iain sits on the Board of the Global Centre for Pluralism based in 
Ottawa, Canada.  
This article is based on a Submission to the Religious Freedom Review 
on 14th February 2018. The author acknowledges the assistance of Anna 
Walsh (PhD candidate) in her helpful review of the Submission. Part of 
that Submission (and this article) is based on an earlier submission in a 
different but related area: Iain T. Benson, Understanding Human Rights in 
Context, A Submission to the Human Rights Inquiry of the Queensland 
Government, Australia, 17th April 2017.
Endnotes
1.  Patrick Parkinson, Protecting Diversity: Towards a Better Legal Frame-
work for Religious Freedom in Australia (Freedom for Faith, January 
2018), 58ff.
2.  Claims for ‘equality’ that turn out to rank at least second behind 
quests for ‘reform’ are not new. See C.B. Macpherson, The Real World 
of Democracy (Toronto: Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1965), 
59, in which he observes that Marxian and Rousseauean concepts 
have ‘one thing in common…. [b]elieving as they do that the most 
important thing is the reformation of society, and realizing that this 
requires political power, they are not prepared to encourage or even 
allow such political freedoms as might hinder their power to reform 
the society. Thus political freedoms come a poor second to the drive 
for the new kind of society they believe to be necessary for the 
realization of equal human rights. Freedom is sacrificed to equality; 
or, more accurately, present freedoms are sacrificed to a vision of fuller 
and more equal freedom in the future. Freedom, in this view, contra-
dicts itself…’ (emphasis added). It is useful to recall Rousseau’s for-
mulation of and commitment to ‘civil religion’ with the correspond-
ing demand that religions other than, of course, civil religion ‘…must 
withdraw from civic life’. See Douglas Farrow, ‘Of Secularity and Civil 
Religion’, in Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society, ed. Douglas 
Farrow (Montreal: McGill-Queens, 2004), 140–182 at 157-158.
3.  Parkinson, Protecting Diversity, 79.
4.  Trinity Western University v. The Law Society of British Columbia 
(SCC), 15 June 2018. The dissenting judgement of Justices Brown 
and Cote is highly critical of the majority judgement which, 
amongst other things, largely ignored the unanimous five-judge 
decision of the BC Court of Appeal in favour of the University and 
strongly affirming a meaning of diversity that allowed the public 
square to have different views of marriage - as the Civil Marriage 
Legislation itself mandated. The sleight of hand employed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada majority judges is a very worrying sign.
5.  See Iain T. Benson, ‘Considering Secularism’, in Recognizing Religion, 
ed. Farrow, at 83-98.
6.  Article 29(2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights. On Article 18 
see ‘Article 18: an orphaned right’, A report to the All Party Parlia-
mentary Group on International Religious Freedom (London: House 
of Lords, undated) [2013].
7.  See Iain T. Benson, ‘Should There be a Legal Presumption in Favour 
of Diversity? Some Preliminary Reflections’, in Religion, Liberty and 
the Jurisdictional Limits of Law, eds Iain T. Benson and Barry W. 
Bussey (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2017), 3–27.
8.  This goes further than the submission of Professor Patrick Parkin-
son, Protecting Diversity, 100. The rationale for this extension is to 
involve civil society more intentionally in the outworking of law 
and politics, for the improvement of the common good through co-
operative initiatives that include civil society but extend beyond it 
to co-operation with the state itself. A Constitutional gesture in this 
direction is Section 234 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa (1996), which provides for the creation of additional Charters 
so as to ‘enhance the culture of Democracy’. The first use of this 
provision was the 2010 signing of the South African Charter of Reli-
gious Rights and Freedoms, an innovative and important document 
assembled over some years with the input of all the major (and 
many of the minor) religions of South Africa. The author was one 
of the principal drafters of the Charter. (See strasbourgconsortium.
org.) See also Iain T. Benson, ‘Religious interfaith work in Canada 
and South Africa with particular focus on the drafting of a South 
African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms’, HTS Teologiese 
Studies / Theological Studies 69, No. 1 | a1319 (2013). 
 Governments should consider ways in which initiatives might encour-
age civil society involvements in relation to religious liberty and the 
development of richer conceptions of citizenship. See Iain T. Benson, 
‘Civic Virtues and the Politics of Full Drift Ahead’, 2017 Acton Lecture 
(Sydney: Centre for Independent Studies, 2017), cis.org.au.
9.  The terms ‘attack’ and ‘coerce’ are chosen carefully and reflect, 
unfortunately, the sort of approach some academics have argued 
for in other countries. Consider the following passages from lead-
ing South African Constitutional scholars Pierre de Vos and David 
Bilchitz. De Vos calls for attacks against those who hold different 
views on ‘same-sex marriage’ and writes: ‘[I]f everyone has the 
right to be different and if we must move away from the idea that 
heterosexuality forms the normative basis for policy formulation, 
then the very institutions which valorise a certain manifestation 
of heterosexuality . . . in our society must be under attack. A prime 
candidate for re-invention or reconstruction must surely be the 
institutions of “marriage” and the “family”, the very institutions 
which have been deployed to regulate and police intimate relations 
in our society’. See Pierre de Vos, ‘Same-Sex Sexual Desire and the 
Re-Imagining of the South African Family’, South African Journal of 
Human Rights 20, No. 2 (2004), 179-206 at 187 (emphasis added). 
David Bilchitz, for his part, seeks to use law to ‘coerce change in 














hearts and minds’. See ‘Why Courts Should Not Sanction Unfair 
Discrimination in the Private Sphere: A Reply’, South African Journal 
of Human Rights 28, No. 2 (2012), 296–315 at 314 (emphasis 
added). Both, with respect, misunderstand the proper role of law 
in a diverse and free society, but their approach is one that should 
be noted as there are many proponents of legal coercion. For this 
reason, any laws need to be drafted anticipating inappropriate uses 
and should go out of their way to build in maximal protection for 
diversity and associational difference.
10.  William A. Galston, ‘Religion and the Limits of Liberal Democracy’, 
in Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society, ed. Farrow (Montreal: 
McGill-Queens University Press, 2004), 41-50 at 43-44, 49. The 
term ‘civic totalism’ Galston acknowledges he has taken from 
another American theorist, Stephen Macedo.
11.  John Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism (New York: The New Press, 2000).
12.  Galston, ‘Religion and the Limits’, 49 (emphasis added).
13.  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 
(1998) 1517, 1574–1575 (Sachs J) (emphasis added).
14.  Irwin Cotler, ‘Jewish Nongovernmental Organizations’, in Religious 
Conscience, the State and the Law, eds John McLaren and Harold 
Coward (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 77–96 at 77.
15.  Michael Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry’, in Human 
Rights as Politics and Idolatry, ed. Amy Gutman (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 2001), 3–98.
16.  Ignatieff, ‘Human Rights’, 53.
17.  Despite litigating its right to graduate education students from its 
University over a decade and a half ago - see Trinity Western Univer-
sity v British Columbia College of Teachers, [2001] 1 SCR 772. Trinity 
Western University (‘TWU’, a private evangelical protestant univer-
sity in Western Canada) had to litigate all over again for the right to 
have a Christian-based law school, despite having its accreditation 
already approved by those with statutory authority to do so. Preju-
dice against the religious views about acceptable sexual morality 
are being dressed up as ‘discrimination’ and the nature of legal ac-
creditation as ‘public’, interpreted so as to shut down the properly 
public aspect of religious involvement in Canadian society. This 
case alone ought to provide Australians with a case-study of how 
human rights conceptions (anti-discrimination) can be widely used 
to shut down diversity and attack those with now unpopular views 
related to sexuality. The case was argued before the Canadian 
courts in three provinces.
 Though not a human rights case per se, the problem of an over-
extension of law so as to oppress religious diversity can happen, 
as shown in Canada, in both human rights and Charter of Rights 
frameworks. For a review of some of the issues and an argument 
against this domination of dissenting associations by elites, see 
Iain T. Benson, ‘Law Deans, Legal Coercion and the Freedoms 
of Association and Religion in Canada’, The Advocate 71, Part 5 
(September 2013), 671-675, at papers.ssrn.com. The 7-2 decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada on 15 June 2018, overturning a 
unanimous decision of a five-justice division of the British Colum-
bia Court of Appeal, falsely suggests that dis-allowing accreditation 
advances diversity. The British Columbia Court of Appeal (and the 
dissenting judges Cote and Brown of the Supreme Court of Canada) 
understood diversity in practice – in contrast, the majority judges of 
the Supreme Court advance a civic totalist conception that, while 
giving lip-service to ‘diversity’, undercut it completely in practice.
18.  A recent volume published in Canada actually suggests that some-
thing known as ‘deep equality’ should be embraced. According to 
the rather vague arguments in the book, ‘[deep equality] requires 
an abandonment of language that establishes hierarchies of dif-
ference, such as “tolerance” and “accommodation”’. See Lori G. Bea-
man (ed.), Reasonable Accommodation: Managing Religious Diversity 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2012), 213. Part 
of this quest for ‘deep equality’ involves the suggestion that ‘…the 
content of religions should be opened to fair and public assess-
ment’ and that this is ‘an admission that this is already taking place 
in the courts’, 218-219. This article calls for ‘deep diversity’ as, in 
part, a response to the frankly totalitarian dimensions of ‘deep 
equality’ which emerge from the pages of this Canadian volume. 
This book and some of its more startling claims are discussed in 
considerable detail in the author’s PhD thesis: Iain T. Benson, ‘An 
Associational Framework for the Reconciliation of Competing Rights 
Claims Involving the Freedom of Religion’ (Unpublished PhD thesis, 
Witwatersrand, 2013), 120-125.
19.  Paul Horwitz, The Agnostic Age: Law Religion and the Constitution 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 22 (emphasis added).
20.  Edward Andrews, The Genealogy of Values (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1995), 170.
21.  David Novak, ‘Human Dignity and the Social Contract’, in Recogniz-
ing Religion, ed. Farrow (Montreal: McGill-Queens Press, 2004), 
51-68 at 56-57 (emphasis added). On the tensions between liberal-
ism, pluralism, religions and ‘transformative constitutionalism’, see 
the insightful chapter ‘Liberalism, Pluralism and Religion’ in Ronald 
Beiner, Philosophy in a Time of Lost Spirit: Essays on Contemporary 
Theory (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997), 44-50. 
22.  Seen graphically in the recent majority decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the Trinity Western University decision referred 
to above at footnotes 4 and 17.
23.  Iain T. Benson, ‘An Associational Framework’, Chapter 5 at 126–152, 
citing Canadian scholar Alvin Esau and South African scholar Shaun 
de Freitas. Esau has consistently argued for an ‘organic’ approach 
to understanding religious associations. Alvin Esau, ‘“Islands of 
Exclusivity”: Religious Organizations and Employment Discrimi-
nation’, UBC Law Review 33 (2000), 719–827 at 726, where the 
author places himself in the shoes of a sensitive commentator not 
imposing his own views on the religion but asking, as it were, from 
the perspective of the association: ‘[w]hat if the religious employer 
expects that the workplace itself should be a community of faith, 
where people work and witness together?’ In South Africa, Shaun 
de Freitas has endorsed Esau’s approach - see ‘Freedom of Associa-
tion as a Foundational Right: Religious Associations and Strydom 
v. Nederduitse Gereformeerde Gemeente, Moreleta Park’, (2012) 28 
SAJHR, 258–272, wiredspace.wits.ac.za.
24.  Forced referrals in relation to abortion are stipulated in the NSW 
policy regarding abortion. And recommendations in Canada from 
the recent (November 2015) ‘Experts’ Report’ on euthanasia, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Carter v. Canada 
(Attorney General) [2015] 1 SCR 331, somewhat shockingly show 
no respect for dissent from providing euthanasia on the part of in-
dividual physicians or denominational facilities themselves; the Su-
preme Court was less draconian. Many Canadians have expressed 
serious concerns about the scant regard being given to dissent and 
difference in this controversial area. 
 Australia will sooner or later face the same issues and the same 
pressures to coerce dissenting citizens by law. Already in NSW the 
Policy Directive Doc Number PD 2005_587 ‘Pregnancy – Framework 
for Terminations in New South Wales Public Health Organisations’ 
(25 May 2005), Section 4.2 dealing with ‘Conscientious objec-
tion’, states as follows: ‘In the circumstances where staff have a 
conscientious objection to participate in terminations of pregnancy 
or administer any abortifacient agents there is an obligation to 
transfer the care of the patient to another medical specialist (or 
health professional) on site or at another AHD facility’. Thus there 
is a complete failure to respect the conscientious objections of 
medical specialists - they are required to be in the chain of causa-
tion for the very procedure they find conscientiously unaccept-
able. This is unfair and unacceptable. Should health authorities 
have any concerns about a particular patient obtaining legal (but 
controversial) services the onus is on them, not on the practitioner, 
to provide alternatives. There is no reason, for example, why simple 
provision of a phone number by NSW Health, and the keeping of 
a list of non-objecting professionals at the other end of the phone 
and on the internet, cannot ‘join the dots’ in these circumstances. 
The provision on ‘conscientious objection’ is coercive and provides 
no respect for dissent - it is just this sort of coercion that any ap-
proaches to law needs to guard against.
 That NSW is out of step with the practice in other countries may 
be seen by comparison with the Canadian Medical Association 
‘Policy on Induced Abortion’ (1988), which contains no duty to 
provide ‘effective referrals’ in such situations. The Policy provides 
that: ‘A physician whose moral or religious beliefs prevent him or 
her from recommending or performing an abortion should inform 
the patient of this so that she may consult another physician. No 
discrimination should be directed against doctors who do not 
perform or assist at induced abortions. Respect for the right of 
personal decision in this area must be stressed, particularly for 
doctors training in obstetrics and gynecology, and anesthesia’ 
(Canadian Medical Association, CMA Policy: Induced Abortion, 
policybase.cma.ca, 2). Recent developments in both Australia and 
Ireland (in the wake of that country’s change to the abortion law) 
show that the Canadian Medical Association’s policy of not requir-
ing referrals is not being followed elsewhere; a most worrying 
development for those favouring respect for dissent and diversity. 
The Review should suggest the need for the onus to be on the 
state rather than on physicians in such circumstances.
25.  See: Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott [2013] 
1 SCR 467. The author declares an interest as he was counsel for 
the Respondent (Whatcott) on the appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Canada.
26.  Per J. Rothstein for the unanimous Supreme Court of Canada at 
paras 56-59.
27.  See R. Moon, Submission to the Canadian Human Rights Commis-
sion concerning section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act and 
the regulation of hate speech on the internet prepared by Richard 
Moon, October 2008 (January 2009), ohrc.on.ca.
28.  South African Charter of Religious Rights and Freedoms, 2010.
